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Abstract
The idea that development is the expression of information accumulated
during evolution and that heredity is the transmission of this information
is surprisingly hard to cash out in strict, scientific terms. This paper seeks
to do so using the sense of information introduced by Francis Crick in his
sequence hypothesis and central dogma of molecular biology. It focuses on
Crick’s idea of precise determination. This is analysed using an information
theoretic measure of causal specificity. This allows us to reconstruct some of
Crick’s claims about information in transcription and translation. Crick’s ap-
proach to information has natural extensions to non-coding regions of DNA,
to epigenetic marks, and to the genetic or environmental upstream causes
of those epigenetic marks. Epigenetic information cannot be reduced to ge-
netic information. The existence of biological information in epigenetic and
exogenetic factors is relevant to evolution as well as to development.
Keywords: Genetic information, Epigenetics, Specificity
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1. Genetic Information1
That the development of evolved characteristics is the expression of infor-2
mation accumulated in the genome during evolution and that heredity is the3
transmission of this information from one generation to the next will strike4
most biologists as common-sense. But it is surprisingly difficult to cash out5
this statement in a way that is grounded in the detailed theory and practice6
of the biosciences 1. Biology today is certainly an ‘information science’, both7
because it is a science of big data and because many specific models are in-8
spired by the information sciences, but these applications and models do not9
seem to be unified by a single conception of biological information. If the10
actual science straightforwardly corresponded to that opening statement, we11
would expect to find that instructions written in the genetic code are read12
by gene regulatory networks to make an organism. But the genetic code runs13
out of steam when it has specified the linear structure of proteins [2]. It is14
impossible to describe higher levels of biological organisation in the genetic15
code for the same reason that I cannot write literature using a geodetic co-16
ordinate system: the language does not have the expressive power. Nor is it17
easy to see how the expressive power of the genetic code could be expanded18
to describe something beyond the order of animo acids in a polypeptide. The19
‘histone codes’ [3] and ‘splicing codes’ [4] that have been proposed as supple-20
ments to the genetic code are not integrated with the genetic code through21
a shared measure of coded information. As things stand, histone modifica-22
tion and mRNA splicing are molecular mechanisms that interact with the23
mechanisms of transcription and translation in the straightforward way that24
any combination of physical mechanisms can interact. This paper outlines25
a measure of information that allows us to compare the contributions made26
by each of these mechanisms to determining a final product in a shared,27
informational currency.28
Turning our attention to gene regulatory networks, these are productively29
modeled as computing Boolean functions and/or differential equations, but30
these computational operations are not specified in any of the three ‘codes’31
to which we just referred. Instead, these operations are specified by the32
stereochemical affinities of genomic regions and gene products. The science33
1In his final book the influential evolutionary theorist George C. Williams called for a
new, ‘codical’ biology founded on the concept of information precisely because that is not
the biology we actually have [1].
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that connects the ‘codes’ with the ‘computing networks’ is the physics of how34
stereochemical properties emerge from the linear structure of biomolecules35
and the cellular contexts in which those biomolecules mature and function.36
The same is true of the other molecular networks that are at the heart of37
our understanding of the cell – when we model these networks as performing38
computations those formal operations do not take as inputs representations39
written in the genetic code.40
All this suggests that perhaps ‘biology is an information science’ only in41
the sense that it uses many models that start with analogies to some aspect42
of communication or computing, and makes many direct applications of for-43
malisms from the information sciences. Each of these models or applications44
stands or falls on its own scientific merits. They do not link together to form45
a single theory of biological information or a theory of life as an informational46
phenomenon [5] [6][7][2]. On this sceptical view the ubiquity of information47
talk in biology is only evidence of the power and generality of theories of in-48
formation and computation, something we can observe in many other areas49
of science.50
This paper defends a more robust view of biological information, however.51
It argues that there is an important sense of ‘information’ which is related52
very closely to the older notion of biological ‘specificity’. Biological informa-53
tion in this sense gives scientific substance to the claim that development is54
the expression of information accumulated during evolution, and that hered-55
ity is the transmission of this information from one generation to the next.56
These claims turns out to be more or less equivalent to the idea that heredity57
is the ability of one cell to transmit biological specificity to another and that58
development is the expression of that specificity in a controlled manner.59
The paper builds on Paul Griffiths and Karola Stotz’s ‘bottom-up’ ap-60
proach to biological information, starting with a simple concept of informa-61
tion that plays a straightforward role at the heart of molecular biology and62
seeing how many other aspects of biology can be clarified by applying this63
sense of information. That starting point is what they termed ‘Crick infor-64
mation’, the sense of information introduced by Francis Crick (1958) in his65
‘sequence hypothesis’ and ‘central dogma of molecular biology’ [8][9]266
2Griffiths and Stotz used the phrase ‘Crick information’ to refer to what, in this article,
will be called ‘sequence specificity’. In more recent work I and my collaborators have
reserved the term ‘Crick information’ for a measure of the intrinsic information content
of a sequence, rather than for the measure of the relationship between a sequence and its
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Given the central role of Crick’s ideas in molecular biology it is surprising67
that previous efforts to explicate the idea of biological information have not68
adopted Crick’s straightforward approach. Instead, they have mostly focused69
on the richer connotations of the term ‘information’: ideas like meaning,70
representation, and semiosis.3 Some authors have even attributed this rich71
sense of information to Crick: “The sense of information relevant to the72
central dogma is of course the sort which requires ‘intentionality’, ‘aboutness’,73
‘content’, the representation of other states of affairs. . . ” [13][pp. 550-1].74
As we will see in the next section, nothing could be further from Crick’s75
intentions. The problem with rich approaches to biological information is76
that we do not have developed, technical theories of information in this sense.77
The various terms used in the passage just cited are, as the author admits,78
merely “one or another facet of a philosophically vexed concept”[13][p. 151].79
So the approach amounts to taking this vexed concept, for which we have no80
developed theory, and placing it at the foundations of an account of living81
systems. In this paper, in contrast, we will use only the standard formalism82
of information theory and the idea of biological specificity.83
2. Crick’s conception of information84
The key move made by Crick in his work on protein synthesis was to85
supplement the existing idea of stereochemical specificity, embodied in the86
three-dimensional structure of biomolecules and underlying the well-known87
lock-and-key model of interaction between enzymes and their substrates, with88
the idea of informational specificity, embodied in the linear structure of nu-89
cleic acids that determine the linear structure of a gene product [14][5]. This90
idea is present in Crick’s statements of both the sequence hypothesis, and91
the central dogma (Figure 1):92
The Sequence Hypothesis . . . In its simplest form it assumes that93
the specificity of a piece of nucleic acid is expressed solely by the94
sequence of its bases, and that this sequence is a (simple) code95
for the amino acid sequence of a particular protein.96
causes that is the subject of this article.
3Sahotra Sarkar [5] gives a brief history of efforts by molecular biologists to construct
a theory of biological information. Key papers in philosophical literature are[10][11]. For
‘biosemiotics’ see [12]
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DNA
RNA Protein
Figure 1: The Central Dogma, as it is held today. After [16], with modifications. In
particular, an arrow from dna to protein has been removed.
The Central Dogma This states that once ‘information’ has passed97
into a protein it cannot get out again. In more detail, the transfer98
of information from nucleic acid to protein may be possible, but99
transfer from protein to protein, or from protein to nucleic acid100
is impossible. Information means here the precise determination101
of sequence, either of bases in the nucleic acid or of amino-acid102
residues in the protein. [15][pp. 152-153, italics in original]103
According to Crick the process of protein synthesis involves “the flow of104
energy, the flow of matter, and the flow of information.” While noting the105
importance of the “exact chemical steps”, he separated this transfer of mat-106
ter and energy from what he regarded as “the crux of the problem”, namely107
how to join the amino acids in the right order – “the crucial act of sequen-108
tialization.” His solution to this problem would “particularly emphasise the109
flow of information” where “By information I mean the specification of the110
amino acid sequence of the protein” [15][144].111
Crick maintained the same, straightforward view of information through-112
out his career. In his well-known paper clarifying the central dogma he113
reiterated that his key achievement in 1958 was to reduce the problem of114
protein synthesis to “the formulation of the general rules for information115
transfer from one polymer with a defined alphabet to another.” [16][561]116
Information is a causal concept, referring simply to precise determination.117
Crick reiterated this forty years later: “. . . ‘Information’ in the dna, rna,118
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protein sense is merely a convenient shorthand for the underlying causal ef-119
fect.” (Crick to Morgan, March 20 1998 ). “As to ‘information,’ I imagine120
one could avoid the word if one didn’t like it and say ‘detailed residue-by-121
residue determination’ ” (Crick to Morgan, April 3 1998). Moreover, “As to122
‘meaning’ . . . I would keep away from the term.” (Crick to Morgan, April 3123
1998) 4124
So if we take Crick at his word, then information is about (1) precise125
determination and (2) transfer of biological specificity from one biomolecule126
to another (in both development and in heredity).127
These two aspects of Crick’s ideas about information can be made precise128
using Shannon information measures and algorithmic information measures129
respectively. This paper concentrates on the first aspect of information and130
on Shannon measures of information.5131
3. Information as precise determination132
When Crick said that he would emphasise information in his account of133
protein synthesis, rather than matter and energy, he meant that he would134
focus on the precise determination of the structure of one biomolecule by135
another. There are variables through which the cell exercises this precise136
determination, notably coding sequences of nucleic acid, and other variables137
through which it does not, such as the presence or absence of an RNA poly-138
merase in the transcription process. Variables of this second kind are ab-139
solutely required to construct the downstream biomolecule: without them140
nothing will happen. But they do not precisely determine the structure of141
that biomolecule: their role will remain the same no matter what particular142
structure is produced. Crick’s distinction between ‘matter and energy’ on the143
one hand and ‘information’ on the other thus corresponds to the standard144
distinction between the efficiency and specificity of a molecular process. The145
efficiency of a molecular process is a matter of how much product is obtained146
4Philosopher Gregory Morgan received two letters from Crick in response to questions
about how and why Crick came to use the concept of information in his work. These were
kindly made available to us by Morgan. Crick also states that the inspiration for his use of
‘code’ in the sequence hypothesis was the Morse Code’s purely syntactic mapping between
two alphabets (Crick to Morgan, April 3 1998)
5A treatment of the second aspect of Crick’s ideas about information using algorithmic
information measures is in preparation
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for a given quantity of inputs. The specificity of the process is the extent to147
which the process produces just one output, rather than other energetically148
equivalent outputs. A well-designed polymerase chain reaction, for example,149
will produce just one DNA product (specificity) but many copies of that150
product (efficiency).151
Biological specificity is explained by locating the variables through which152
cells exercise precise determination of outcomes. In philosophy these vari-153
ables are known (coincidentally as far as the author can discover) as ‘specific154
causes’[17][18]. In earlier work the present author and collaborators have155
developed an information-theoretic approach to measuring the specificity of156
causal relationships [19][20].157
This work was a contribution to the so-called ‘interventionist’ approach158
to causation[21][22], which is based on the insight that “causal relationships159
are relationships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipula-160
tion and control”[17][p. 314]. Interventionists treat causation as relationships161
between the variables that characterise an organised system. These rela-162
tionships can be represented by a directed acyclic graph. In such a graph,163
variable C is a cause of variable E when a suitably isolated manipulation164
of C would change the value of E. With suitable restrictions on the idea165
of ‘manipulation’ this test provides a criterion of causation, distinguishing166
causal relationships between variables from merely correlational relationships167
[21][pp. 94-107].168
Using this definition most events have many, many causes. But only some169
of these causal relationships are highly specific. The presence of oxygen in170
the atmosphere was one cause of the bushfire, but the arsonist was a more171
specific cause. The intuitive idea of specificity is that interventions on C172
can be used to produce any one of a large number of values of E, so that173
the cause variable has what Woodward terms “fine-grained influence” over174
the effect variable [17][p. 302]. This idea can be quantified using Shannon175
information theory with the addition or an intervention operator that allows176
us to isolate the causal component of the correlation between variables:177
SPEC: the specificity of a causal variable is obtained by measur-178
ing how much mutual information interventions on that variable179
carry about the effect variable.6180
6[19][20]. This measure has been independently proposed in neuroscience [23]and in
the computational sciences [24]. For other related measures see [25][26].
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Formally, the specificity (I) of C for E against a background of other181
variables B is:182
I(Ĉ;E|B̂) =
∑
b
p(̂b)
∑
c
p(ĉ|̂b)
∑
e
p(e|ĉ, b̂) log2
p(e|ĉ, b̂)
p(e|̂b)
(1)
Equation 1 is a variant on the equation for Shannon’s mutual information,183
which measures the overlap, or redundancy, in the probability distributions of184
two variables. Thê(‘hat’) on a variable denotes Judea Pearl’s intervention185
operator [22] and indicates that the value of that variable is determined186
by intervention rather than observation. These interventions transform the187
symmetrical mutual information measure into an asymmetric measure of188
causal influence, since it now represents not the observed correlation between189
the variables, but the effect on E of experimentally intervening on C whilst190
controlling for background variables B. If two variables are not causally191
connected, then however strongly they are correlated, I(Ĉ;E|B̂) = 0.192
A more intuitive way to think about the specificity measure is that it193
measures the extent to which an agent can reduce their uncertainty about194
the value of the effect variable if they can change the value of the cause, that195
is, the extent to which the agent can precisely determine the value of E by196
intervening on C.197
SPEC can be used to measure either how specifically two variables are198
connected (potential causal influence) or how much of the actual variation199
in E in some data is causally explained by variation in C (actual causal200
influence) [19][20]. Whilst the use of Shannon information theory means201
that the measure is restricted to discrete variables, equivalent measures of202
metric variables are possible. None of these additional complexities need203
concern us in the present discussion, however. Instead, we will briefly see how204
SPEC can be used to elucidate the difference between sources of specificity,205
such as coding sequences of DNA, on the one hand and sources of efficiency,206
such as RNA polymerase, on the other. We will then turn our attention to207
generalising this approach to sequence specificity.208
4. Genetic and epigenetic information209
If biological information is precise determination, as measured by SPEC,210
then it is easy to see that DNA is a rich source of information in the produc-211
tion of biomolecules in a way that distinguishes it from many other causes212
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of those biomolecules. Varying the sequence of DNA exerts fine-grained con-213
trol over the structure of the molecules produced. Griffiths and collaborators214
[19][pp. 539-40] constructed a toy causal model of transcription with three215
variables: RNA Polymerase (POL), which is either Present or Absent, DNA,216
whose values are alternative DNA sequences, and RNA, whose values are217
alternative RNA sequences. The value of RNA depends on both POL and218
DNA. Nothing is transcribed if POL = absent and when POL = present,219
each value of DNA determines a unique value of RNA. This is roughly how220
Crick imagined transcription, although, of course, the chemical nature of the221
transcription machinery was unknown. Assuming for simplicity a maximum222
entropy distribution over both POL and DNA, the specificity of POL for223
RNA can never exceed 1 bit, since POL has an entropy of 1 bit and the mu-224
tual information between two variables cannot exceed the lowest maximum225
entropy of either variable. However, once the number of possible values of226
DNA each determining a unique RNA product exceeds 4, then DNA will227
always have > 1 bit of specificity for RNA. 7228
Calculations on a toy model are of limited interest. However, the approach229
that lies behind them has some immediate exciting consequences. The first is230
that this measure can be applied to both coding and non-coding regions in the231
genome to allow a quantitative comparison of the contribution of variables of232
both kinds to the precise determination of the sequence of a biomolecule. For233
example, mutations to any of the many well-characterised intronic splicing234
enhancer (ISE) or silencer (ISS) regions change the probability that one or235
more exons will be removed from the resulting transcript [27]. We could236
introduce this process into our toy model by replacing the variable DNA237
with two variables, INT and EXO, whose values would be the intronic and238
exonic content of the original DNA sequences respectively. The existence of239
intronic splicing control regions would be represented by the specificity of240
INT for RNA. This is an absolutely natural extension of the moves Crick241
himself made in his 1958 paper in the light of what we now know about how242
biomolecules are synthesized from the genome. There is sequence specificity243
in non-coding regions.244
Our approach has vindicated the idea that biological information is not245
restricted to the coding regions of the genome, but can be found in other246
7The entropy of RNA is H(RNA) > 2, we have just seen that I(P̂OL;RNA) = 1, and
DNA accounts for all the remaining entropy: I(D̂NA;RNA) = H(RNA|P̂OL) > 1
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functional regions as well. But we can go further. Our measure can be ex-247
tended to variables representing epigenetic (narrow sense, see Box 1.) modi-248
fications of DNA, insofar as they make a difference to the precise sequence of249
biomolecules through their role in the regulation of transcription and post-250
transcriptional and post-translational processing.251
Box 1. Definitions of epigenetic. From [8] [p. 112]
Epigenesis: the idea that the outcomes of development are created in the
process of development, not preformed in the inputs to development; epige-
netic can be used in these senses:
Epigenetics (broad sense Waddington 1940): the study of the causal
mechanisms by which genotypes give rise to phenotypes; the integration of
the effects of individual genes in development to produce the epigenotype.
Epigenetics (narrow sense Nanney 1958): the study of the mechanisms
that determine which genome sequences will be expressed in the cell; the
control of cell differentiation and of mitotically and sometimes meiotically
heritable cell identity.
Epigenetic inheritance (narrow sense): the inheritance of genome ex-
pression patterns across generations (e.g. through meiosis) in the absence of
a continuing stimulus.
Epigenetic inheritance (broad sense): the inheritance of phenotypic
features via causal pathways other than the inheritance of nuclear DNA. We
refer to this as exogenetic inheritance (West and King 1987).
252
253
Numerous mechanisms have been suggested by which epigenetic marks254
could determine which exons will be included in a mature mRNA. RNA splic-255
ing is frequently co-transcriptional, either by splicing actually occurring while256
the pre-mRNA is still being transcribed or by the recruitment of factors that257
determine later splicing whilst the pre-mRNA is being transcribed. This cre-258
ates many opportunities for interaction between the splicing machinery and259
chromatin. The strongest direct evidence to date of epigenetic determination260
of alternative splicing is by alternative methylation states of histones. Indi-261
rect evidence suggests multiple significant roles for chromatin in determining262
alternative splicing [28][29][30].263
Epigenetic regulation of splicing is another missing variable in the toy264
model described above. If we extended the model to include it, variable(s)265
representing the methylation and acetylation state of histones would have266
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some specificity for the RNA product variable. So, by a direct application of267
Crick’s original reasoning, there is both genetic and epigenetic information in268
Crick’s original sense: both genes and epigenes can have sequence specificity.269
Epigenetic modifications of chromatin can have sequence specificity. This270
will seem unsurprising to many biologists, given the number of papers that271
described the discovery of such mechanisms as the discovery of ‘missing in-272
formation’ for splicing [27][30]. This way of speaking need not be regarded273
in the deflationary manner described in Section 1. The approach to infor-274
mation outlined here shows that it can be taken literally as a step towards a275
unified theory of biological information. Sequence specificity is a measurable276
quantity that plays a causal role in the production of biomolecules, namely277
the precise determination of their linear structure.278
5. Why epigenetic information cannot be reduced to genetic infor-279
mation280
A common thought about why epigenetics cannot be a distinct source281
of information is worth considering, because it throws light on why Crick282
needed to introduce the idea of information. The thought is that, because283
the machinery that creates epigenetic modifications consists of molecules284
transcribed from the genome, the information in the epigenetic marks must285
ultimately be derived from the genome.286
“The problem with this kind of hair splitting is that ultimately287
the extra information (e.g. methylation) is provided by enzymes288
(methylases) encoded by genes in the genome. Epigenetics, per289
se, doesn’t add any new information. It’s just a consequence, or290
outcome, of the information already in the DNA.” 8291
This informal comment is significant precisely because it is a typical first292
response to the idea that epigenetic marks contain information that supple-293
ments the information in the genome. This response makes it clearer why294
Crick needed to distinguish “the flow of energy, the flow of matter, and the295
flow of information.” (1958, 144) The concept of specificity is a causal con-296
cept, not a material one, and identifying the sources of biological specificity297
8Larry Moran, Sandwalk Blog: http://sandwalk.blogspot.com.au/2016/10/extending-
evolutionary-theory-paul-e.html Accessed 2016-12-08. This was a response to the abstract
of the conference presentation from which this article is derived.
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requires measuring causal control, not material contributions. Once we look298
at the matter in this light it becomes clear that some epigenetic modifications299
are specified by genomes whilst others are not.300
To see why the ‘matter and energy’ side of how epigenetic marks are301
created is not relevant, consider a case in which epigenetic marks are a site302
of conflict between multiple genomes. In cases of parental imprinting of303
genes it is biological common-sense that the parent, not merely the offspring,304
is a source of the biological information expressed in offspring phenotype. If305
this genetic conflict is mediated by epigenetic mechanisms that contribute306
to the precise determination of the sequence of gene products, for example307
by affecting which exons are included in a transcript [31], then it makes no308
sense to say that the information specifying the splice variant all comes from309
the offspring genome. The fact that the coding sequences for the enzymes310
involved in establishing and maintaining the methylation pattern are in the311
offspring genome is irrelevant. The relevant issue is where causal control312
is being exercised over the transcription and processing of those sequences.313
When parental imprints are established, the offspring provides the efficiency314
of the reaction, but the parent provides at least part of the specificity of the315
reaction.316
Now consider a case where the epigenetic mechanism that contributes to317
the precise determination of phenotype is influenced by the offspring’s en-318
vironment. For example, regulation of alternative splicing by temperature319
seems to be an important mechanism for maintaining circadian rhythms in320
a wide range of species [32][33]. It seems reasonable to describe this as a321
mechanism for conveying environmental information to the genome, so that322
genome expression can be correctly matched to the environment. After all,323
the adaptive problem facing the organism is to reduce its uncertainty about324
where it is in the diurnal cycle and it does this by responding to an environ-325
mental cue. Our account of information vindicates this idea - we could, at326
least in principle, measure the contribution of the environmental variable to327
the precise determination of sequence, just as we did the contribution of the328
epigenetic marks further along in the causal graph. The fact that the coding329
sequences for the enzymes involved are in the genome is irrelevant. The real330
issue is where causal control is being exercised over the transcription and pro-331
cessing of those sequences. In this case, evolution has designed a mechanism332
which detects and responds to information from the environment.333
In this section we have seen that our measure can be used to identify334
sequence specificity in both coding and non-coding sequences, in epigenetic335
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marks, and in the causes of those marks, whether that is other genomes in336
cases of genetic conflict, or the environment in cases of plasticity. Information337
in Crick’s sense is about precise determination. We have expanded the class338
of things that do the determining beyond those Crick originally envisaged.339
In the following section we will also expand the class of things that get340
determined.341
6. Sequence specificity and other biological information342
Crick used ‘information’ to label the distinctive relationship of precise343
determination that holds between coding sequences of nucleic acids and the344
order of elements in their products, a relationship which does not hold be-345
tween those products and many of their other causes. However, in Sections346
4 and 5 we saw that some other causes do have this relationship to the order347
of elements in gene products. In this section we ask whether this distinc-348
tive relationship of precise determination exists for phenotypes more distal349
than the primary structure of RNAs or proteins. In this context we will not350
talk of ‘sequence specificity’, reserving that term for the precise determina-351
tion of sequence, which was Crick’s original concern. We will use the more352
general term ‘biological information’ to refer to the precise determination of353
phenotypes that are causally downstream of the primary structure of gene354
products, phenotypes such as the tertiary structure of proteins, and still more355
distally, morphology, and behavior.356
As we noted in Section 1, the expressive power of the genetic code is357
limited to specifying the linear order of elements in a polypeptide. Changes358
to DNA coding sequences cause a whole chain of events, but they do not code359
for the more distal events in that chain [2]. The use of ‘code’ in this extended360
sense is metaphorical, like saying that when Richard Nixon literally ordered361
the Watergate cover-up he also ‘ordered’ his own downfall.362
But while the genetic triplet code is limited in this way, the broader idea363
of information as precise determination is not. The idea of information as364
precise determination, whether measured using SPEC or another measure,365
can be applied to any set of variables arranged in a causal graph. In principle,366
therefore, our approach can be used to measure biological information in a367
gene (or an epigene) with respect to any downstream variable affected by that368
gene. In fact, a range of causal Shannon information measures related to the369
one introduced here are already used in complex systems science to study a370
wide spectrum of living and non-living systems [34]. Genes or epigenes may371
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not literally ‘code’ for morphology and behavior, but they do literally contain372
biological information that specifies to some measurable degree morphology373
and behavior.374
It is now possible to extend our approach to biological information to375
mechanisms of exogenetic heredity (broad-sense epigenetic inheritance, see376
Box 1). We have already seen that environmental factors can have sequence377
specificity, since they can be specific causes of epigenetic modifications of378
chromatin and thus contribute to the precise determination of the structure379
of biomolecules. But there are broader mechanisms of environmental hered-380
ity, such as habitat or host imprinting, in which the phenotype of offspring381
is influenced by parental phenotype but where no epigenetic mark is trans-382
mitted through meiosis, so there is no epigenetic inheritance in the standard,383
narrow sense. These broader mechanisms are still usually referred to as ‘epi-384
genetic inheritance’ but we will refer to them as exogenetic inheritance to385
avoid confusion. The question of whether such environmental variables con-386
tribute information to development becomes the considerably more precise387
question of how specific is the causal relationship between those variables388
and variables representing morphology and behavior.389
At this point we have something like a general theory of biological infor-390
mation. Information refers to a distinctive relationship of precise determi-391
nation, which we can identify with the older concept of biological specificity.392
The phenomenon of biological specificity is explained by the existence of393
causes through which organisms exercise precise determination of outcomes,394
and the functional expression of this specificity is explained by natural se-395
lection acting on those causes. Central to organisms’ ability to exercise this396
highly specific control is the relationship of precise determination originally397
identified by Crick between the sequence of DNA and the sequences of RNA398
and protein. Heredity is the transfer of biological specificity from one gener-399
ation to the next. Central to organisms’ ability to transfer specificity in this400
way is the existence of coding sequences of DNA which contain the informa-401
tion to determine the specificity of their products.9402
9Comparison of causal roles need not be reduced to a simple ‘more or less specific’. For
example, elucidating the distinction between permissive and instructive induction events
in development requires a more complex application of the tools used here [35]
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7. Development and evolution403
We have seen that there can be genetic, epigenetic and exogenetic sources404
of biological information in development. How significant the later two405
sources are in development is an empirical question. But even biologists406
who find it plausible that epigenetic and exogenetic factors are significant in407
development are often sceptical about whether they are significant in evolu-408
tion. The most common reason for this scepticism is that epigenetic marks409
are relatively unstable when compared to genetic mutations.410
The key point is that if epigenetic states are important to evolu-411
tion, they are important through stable changes in these states,412
namely transmissible epimutations. And if epimutations are not413
transmitted with reasonable stability over generations, they can-414
not have any long-term evolutionary potential (Slatkin 2009). If415
an epimutation is to have evolutionary importance, it must per-416
sist. [36] [p. 391]417
The stability of epigenetic marks is certainly an important question. But418
whether their evolutionary significance turns on their stability depends on419
what is meant by ‘evolutionary significance’. In at least one important sense420
of that phrase, epigenetic marks do not need to be stable to be significant. It421
is surely reasonable to regard a biological phenomenon as having evolutionary422
significance if it has widespread and substantial impact on the dynamics423
of evolution, or, to put it another way, if models that do not include this424
phenomena are unlikely to correctly predict the course of evolution. But we425
already know that this is the case from work on the evolutionary genetics of426
maternal effects [37]. Maternal effects can be defined as the causal influence427
of maternal genotype or phenotype on offspring phenotype independent of428
offspring genotype [38], which is in line with the approach taken here to429
defining epigenetic and exogenetic information. Maternal effects may be430
either epigenetic or exogenetic, depending on the specific causal pathway by431
which maternal influence is exerted.432
Maternal effects, and parental effects generally, are recognised as a sig-433
nificant factor in evolution [39]. But any form of epigenetic or exogenetic434
heredity that is a significant source of biological information in the sense435
defined above will be significant in the same way because it substantially436
alters the mapping from parent phenotype to offspring phenotype. In this437
sense, epigenetic and exogenetic heredity is significant for evolution for the438
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same reason that Mendelian models of heredity were significant. The pri-439
mary significance of Mendelism for the theory of natural selection was that440
it specified the form of the transmission phase. Epigenetic and exogenetic441
heredity change this form, and even in the most conventional cases, where442
maternal effects are simply a one-generation time-lag in the expression of an443
allele, this has substantial impact on the dynamics of natural selection.444
Since Wilkins is well aware of all these points we can infer that this is not445
the sense in which he is asking ‘if epigenetic states are important to evolu-446
tion.’ Another valid sense of that question is whether epigenetic or exogenetic447
mutations can be the basis of cumulative adaptation. It is plausible that an448
unstable inheritance system cannot play this role, but that does not mean449
that it cannot play an important role in a process of cumulative adaptation450
that also involves the genetic heredity system [40]. Finally, an important per-451
spective on the relative evolutionary significance of genetic, epigenetic and452
exogenetic heredity is that they may play complementary roles. For example,453
it is plausible that genetic and epigenetic heredity allows organisms to adapt454
themselves to changing environments on different timescales [41].455
Other authors have argued that to suppose epigenetic inheritance implies456
anything for evolutionary theory is to conflate ‘proximate’ or mechanistic457
with ‘ultimate’ or evolutionary biology. Scott-Phillips et al [42] draw a useful458
comparison between the discovery of epigenetic inheritance and the discovery459
of Mendelian genetics. In the first years of the 20th century some Mendelians460
saw Mendelian inheritance as a theory of evolutionary change and presented461
it as a challenge to the Darwinian theory of natural selection. They suggest462
that authors who present epigenetic inheritance as a challenge to conventional463
neo-Darwinism are like those early Mendelians: they are confusing a proxi-464
mate, mechanistic theory of heredity with an ultimate theory of the causes465
of evolutionary change. Scott-Phillips et al are engaged in a wider dispute466
with authors who question the value of the proximate/ultimate distinction467
[43] and I will not address that wider dispute here. However, with respect468
to the specific issue of whether epigenetic inheritance has implications for469
evolutionary theory, their analogy seems to establish exactly the opposite of470
their intended conclusion. The founders of modern neo-Darwinism did not471
dismiss Mendelism as a merely proximal mechanism, they used it to derive472
the form of the transmission phase in the process of natural selection. As I473
pointed out above, epigenetic and exogenetic heredity shows up in quantita-474
tive genetics as parental effects, and the incorporation of parental effects into475
evolutionary models has a significant effect on evolutionary dynamics. In this476
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way both Mendelian heredity and epigenetic heredity are part of ultimate,477
not merely proximate biology.478
An interesting aspect of Scott-Phillips et al’s argument is their insistence479
that, “Put simply, if we wish to offer an ultimate explanation for the exis-480
tence of some trait, we must make reference to how that trait contributes481
to inclusive fitness.” [42] [p 40]. They base this conclusion on the results of482
Grafen’s ‘formal Darwinism’ project [44] which seeks to show that evolution-483
ary dynamics are in important respects equivalent to the maximisation of484
inclusive fitness. But what is done in this very impressive program of work485
is to rigorously compare optimisation models to population genetic models,486
where the latter models simply assume that there is no epigenetic hered-487
ity. This is not a problem for the formal Darwinism program.10 But it is a488
problem for Scott-Phillips et al, who are effectively arguing that epigenetic489
inheritance cannot contribute to ultimate explanation because maximising490
(genetic) inclusive fitness fully represents evolutionary dynamics in models491
which assume there is no epigenetic inheritance.492
Dickins and Rahman [46] suggest that, while epigenetic inheritance may493
play a role in evolution, those who present it as a challenge to conventional494
neo-Darwinism have only presented evidence that it is a significant proxi-495
mate mechanism. They have failed to present evidence that it is significant496
in ultimate biology. Once again, this seems to overlook the way that epige-497
netic and exogenetic heredity show up in conventional, quantitative genetic498
models, namely as parental effects, and the known impact of such effects on499
evolutionary dynamics.500
8. Conclusion501
We set out to define a sense of ‘information’ that can make sense of the502
idea that development is the expression of information that accumulated503
during evolution and that heredity is the transmission of this information.504
Whilst compelling at a metaphorical level, this is surprisingly hard to cash505
out in serious, scientific terms. We began with a simple conception of infor-506
mation that plays a straightforward role at the heart of molecular biology and507
explored how many other aspects of biology can be clarified using this sense508
10Lu and Bourrat [45] have recently discussed how this program can be extended to
include epigenetic inheritance and suggest that because of this epigenetic inheritance does
not require any radical revision of conventional neo-Darwinism.
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of information. Our starting point was the sense of information introduced509
by Francis Crick in 1958. We identified two aspects of Crick’s conception510
of information (1) precise determination and (2) the transfer of biological511
specificity from one molecule to another. This paper concentrated on the512
first aspect. We analysed the idea of precise determination using an informa-513
tion theoretic measure of causal specificity. Using this measure we showed514
that coding sequences of DNA have a distinctive relationship of precise de-515
termination to RNAs and polypeptides. This distinguishes coding sequences516
from many other causes of the same outcomes, such as the presence of an517
RNA polymerase. This is what Crick meant when he identified coding se-518
quences as containing information and the other causes as not doing so. His519
distinction is closely related to the distinction between the specificity and520
efficiency of a biochemical process.521
Since 1958, however, a great deal has been learnt about the production522
of biomolecules. We saw that Crick’s approach to information has natural523
extensions to non-coding regions of DNA, to epigenetic marks, and to the524
genetic or environmental upstream causes of those epigenetic marks. Any525
of these variables may have sequence specificity, that is, they may con-526
tribute substantially to the precise determination of the linear structure527
of biomolecules. Moreover, we saw that it is a mistake to suppose that528
the sequence specificity of epigenetic marks must always derive from se-529
quence specificity elsewhere in the genome, or in other genomes. Finally,530
we generalised to a broader concept of ‘biological information’ that is ap-531
plicable to more distal phenotypes, and not merely to the linear structure532
of biomolecules. Relationships of precise determination can exist between533
genetic, epigenetic and exogenetic factors in development and distal pheno-534
types, such as morphology and behavior. This gives us a general theory of535
biological information that can be used to restate more precisely the idea with536
which we started. Development is the expression of biological specificity, or537
biological information conceived as precise determination and measured using538
causal information theory. In heredity, factors which are able to exercise this539
precise determination are passed on from previous generations. These factors540
may be genetic, epigenetic or exogenetic. In the penultimate section of the541
article we argued that the existence of biological information in epigenetic542
and exogenetic factors is relevant to evolution as well as to development.543
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